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ABSTRACT
Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice.  We estimate
the empirical importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in a consumer credit market using
a new field experiment methodology.  We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers issued by a major
South African lender along three dimensions: 1) the initial "offer interest rate" appearing on direct
mail solicitations; 2) a "contract interest rate" equal to or less than the offer interest rate and revealed
to the over 4,000 borrowers who agreed to the initial offer rate; and 3) a dynamic repayment
incentive that extends preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remain in good standing.
These three randomizations, combined with complete knowledge of the Lender's information set,
permit identification of specific types of private information problems.  Specifically, our setup
distinguishes adverse selection from moral hazard effects on repayment, and thereby generates
unique evidence on the existence and magnitudes of specific credit market failures.  We find
evidence of both adverse selection (among women) and moral hazard (predominantly among men),
and the findings suggest that about 20% of default is due to asymmetric information problems.  This
helps explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high-
risk borrowers at very high rates.
JEL Codes: C9, D8, G2, G3, O1
Keywords: Information asymmetries, field experiment, adverse selection, moral hazard,
development finance, credit markets, microfinance  2
 
I.  Introduction 
Information asymmetries are often believed to cause credit market failures.  Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) sparked a large literature of theoretical papers on the role of asymmetric information 
in credit markets; this literature has influenced economic policy and practice worldwide.  These 
theories show that information frictions and ensuing credit market failures can produce harmful 
real consequences at both the micro and the macro level, via underinvestment (Gale 1990; Banerjee 
and Newman 1993; Hubbard 1998), overinvestment (de Meza and Webb 1987; Bernanke and 
Gertler 1990), or poverty traps (Mookherjee and Ray 2004). 
Yet empirical evidence on the existence and importance of specific information frictions is 
relatively thin (Chiappori and Salanie (2003)).
1  Distinguishing between adverse selection and 
moral hazard is difficult even when precise data on underwriting criteria and clean variation in 
contract terms are available, as a single interest rate (or insurance contract) may produce 
independent, conflated selection and incentive effects.
2  For example, a positive correlation 
between default and a randomly assigned interest rate, conditional on observable risk, could be due 
to adverse selection ex-ante (those with relatively high probabilities of default will be more likely 
to accept a high rate) or moral hazard ex-post (because those given high rates have greater incentive 
to default). 
More generally, despite widespread interest in liquidity constraints and their real effects, 
empirical evidence on the existence of any specific credit market failure is lacking.  Consequently 
                                                      
1 Note also that the 2001 Nobel Prize Committee’s citation for pioneering work on asymmetric information did not cite 
any empirical work on credit markets, while citing six empirical papers on labor markets and four on insurance markets 
(Bank of Sweden 2001). 
2 See Ausubel (1999) for a related discussion of the problem of disentangling adverse selection and moral hazard in a 
consumer credit market.  See Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2003) for approaches to the 
analogous problem in insurance markets.   3
there is little consensus on the importance of liquidity constraints for individuals.
3  Empirical work 
typically has examined this issue indirectly,
4 either through accounting exercises which calculate 
the fixed and variable costs of lending, or by inferring credit constraints by from an agent’s ability 
to smooth consumption and/or income (e.g., Morduch (1994)).  Work studying the impact of credit 
market failures on the real economy tends to take some reduced-form credit constraint as given 
(e.g., Wasmer and Weil (2004)), or as a hypothesis to be tested (e.g., Banerjee and Duflo (2004)), 
without evidence of a specific friction that may (or may not) actually produce a sub-optimal 
allocation of credit.  Our work provides microfoundations for studying the real effects of credit 
constraints by identifying the presence (or absence) and magnitudes of two specific credit market 
failures: adverse selection and moral hazard. 
We test for the presence of distinct types of hidden information problems using a new 
experimental methodology that disentangles adverse selection from moral hazard effects on 
repayment.  This market field experiment was implemented by a South African firm specializing in 
high-interest, unsecured term lending to poor workers.  The experiment identifies information 
asymmetries by randomizing loan pricing along three dimensions: first on the interest rate offered 
on a direct mail solicitation, second on the actual interest rate on the loan contract, and third on the 
interest rate offered on future loans.
5 
A stylized example, illustrated in Figure 1, captures the heart of our methodology.   
Potential borrowers with the same observable risk are randomly offered a high or a low interest rate 
on a direct-mail solicitation.  Individuals then decide whether to borrow at the solicitation’s “offer” 
rate.  Of those that respond to the high rate, half are randomly given a new lower “contract” interest 
rate, while the remaining half continue to receive the high rate (i.e., their contract rate equals the 
                                                      
3 The empirical importance of credit market failures for firms is also debated; see, e.g., Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and 
Banerjee and Duflo (2004). 
4 See Morduch and Armendariz de Aghion (2005) for a discussion of this literature. 
5 The Lender assumed all of the revenue and repayment risk from these pricing changes.  Some implementation and 
operational costs were shared with the authors, e.g., training and project management.  Although the Lender typically 
employs direct mail solicitation to market to former clients, they have not in the past included price in their letters.   4
offer rate).  Individuals do not know beforehand that the contract rate may differ from the offer 
rate.  Any selection effect is identified by considering the sample that received the low contract 
rate, and comparing the repayment performance of those who responded to the high offer interest 
rate with those who responded to the low  offer interest rate.  This follows from the fact that 
although everyone in this hypothetical sample was randomly assigned identical contracts, they 
selected in at varying, randomly assigned rates, so any difference in repayment is attributable to 
selection on unobservables.  Similarly, any effect of repayment burden (which includes moral 
hazard)
6 is identified by considering the sample that responded to the high offer interest rate and 
comparing the repayment performance of those who received the high contract interest rate with 
those who received the low contract interest rate.  These borrowers selected in identically, but 
ultimately received randomly different interest rates on their contract, and any difference in default 
is attributable to the resulting repayment burden. 
Next, after all terms (loan amount, length of loan, and interest rate) are finalized, we 
randomize whether the contract interest rate applies to the initial loan only or instead to all loans 
within a one year period, conditional on good repayment.  The yearlong assignment explicitly 
raises the benefits of repaying the current loan on time (in the 98% of cases where the contract rate 
is less than the Lender’s standard rate).  Moreover, this “dynamic repayment incentive” does not 
change the costs of repaying the initial loan; initial debt burden is unperturbed.  Any correlation 
between this incentive and default therefore must be driven by choices—pure moral hazard.  The 
dynamic repayment incentive thus yields our sharpest test for the presence of moral hazard. 
                                                      
6 We define moral hazard as the effect of repayment burden on repayment that stems from ex-post behavioral changes 
driven by the incentives of the contract.  Repayment burden also includes a mechanical wealth or income effect: those 
with positive (negative) shocks to wealth or income will be more (less) able to repay higher interest debt.  Section IV 
discusses this in more detail.   5
Our approach to estimating the extent and nature of asymmetric information is thus most 
similar in intent to Edelberg (2004), and in methodology to Ausubel (1999).
7  Edelberg estimates a 
structural model to disentangle the effects of adverse selection and one type of moral hazard (in 
effort) in collateralized consumer credit markets in the United States.  She finds evidence 
consistent with both phenomena.  Ausubel uses market experiments conducted by a large American 
credit card lender to estimate the extent and nature of adverse selection.  He does not attempt to 
account for moral hazard separately, arguing that any such effect must be trivially small over the 
range of interest rates (800 basis points per annum) contracted on in his data. 
We also examine whether the pattern of information asymmetries varies with the gender of 
the borrower, since 75% of the clients in lending programs targeting the poor in developing 
countries are women (Microcredit Summit Campaign 2003).  Microlending institutions have 
targeted women for several reasons, including their relatively reliable repayment behavior.   
Women are better microcredit risks on average, and some of this advantage seems to persist even 
after conditioning on observables used in credit scoring models (Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch 2005).  Most interesting to us is the widespread belief that women are less likely to 
engage in moral hazard of various types.  Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) notes that 
immobility, in particular, may make default relatively costly for female borrowers and monitoring 
relatively cheap their lenders.  The only evidence we know of that addresses gender differences in 
moral hazard is Kevane and Wydick (2001): they find that female borrowing groups were less 
likely to misuse funds than their male counterparts at a group lending institution in Guatemala.  
Practitioners do not seem to hold priors that adverse selection differs by gender, although if social 
sanctions bind more for women, producing risk aversion, it follows that women may also be less 
                                                      
7 At least two other papers endeavor to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in a developing country credit 
market.  Karlan (2004) finds evidence of social capital mitigating moral hazard effects.  Klonner and Rai (2004) uses 
institutional features of rotating credit associations in India, and finds evidence for adverse selection.  Other papers 
estimating the prevalence of private information in credit markets include Calem and Mester (1995), Crook (2002), 
Drake and Holmes (1995), and Cressy and Toivanen (2001).   6
likely to choose ex-ante risky gambles when faced with high interest rates; i.e., adverse selection 
would be less severe among women. 
We find evidence of moral hazard among male borrowers and adverse selection among 
female borrowers.
8  In the full sample, these findings aggregate to robust evidence for moral hazard 
and weak evidence for adverse selection.  The magnitudes of these information problems appear to 
decrease with the length of the prior lending relationship with the Lender.  Where statistically 
significant, the effects of private information are economically important, and overall our results 
indicate that adverse selection and moral hazard explain about 20% of default in our sample.   
Information asymmetries thus help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market 
that specializes in financing high-risk borrowers at very high rates. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides background on South African 
consumer credit markets and our cooperating Lender.  Section III lays out the experimental design 
and implementation.  Section IV details how specific theoretical models motivate the design.   
Section V maps the experimental design and related theory into our empirical strategy.  Section VI 
presents the empirical results.  Section VII concludes with a brief discussion of some implications, 
unresolved questions, and future work. 
 
II.  Market and Lender Overview 
Our cooperating Lender competes in a “cash loan” industry segment that offers small, 
high-interest, short-term credit with fixed repayment schedules to a “working poor” population.  
Cash loan borrowers generally lack the credit history and/or collateralizable wealth needed to 
borrow from traditional institutional sources such as commercial banks.  Cash lenders arose to 
                                                      
8 Several other studies have found evidence of differential behavior by gender in financial markets.  Male private equity 
investors are more likely trade excessively and consequently earn lower returns (Barber and Odean 2001).   Women with 
time inconsistent preferences (but not men) are more likely to use a new commitment savings product (Ashraf, Karlan 
and Yin 2004).  Access to microloans increases household consumption more when a woman is the household’s program 
participant (Pitt and Khandker 1998).   7
substitute for traditional “informal sector” moneylenders following deregulation of the usury 
ceiling in 1992, and they are regulated by the Micro Finance Regulatory Council (MFRC).   
Aggregate outstanding loans equal 38% of non-mortgage consumer credit (Department of Trade 
and Industry South Africa 2003).
9 
Cash loan sizes tend to be small relative to the fixed costs of underwriting and monitoring 
them, but substantial relative to borrower income.  For example, the Lender’s median loan size of 
R1000 ($150) is 32% of its median borrower’s gross monthly income.  Cash lenders focusing on 
the observably highest-risk market segment typically make one-month term loans at 30% interest 
per month.  Lenders targeting observably lower risk segments charge as little as 3% per month.
10  
Rejection is prevalent even at these high rates: the Lender denies 50% of new loan applicants.   
The Lender has been in business over 20 years and is one of the largest micro-lenders in 
South Africa, with over 100 branches throughout the country.  Our experiment took place in a mix 
of 86 urban and rural branches throughout the provinces of Kwazulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Western 
Cape, and Gauteng.  All loan underwriting and transactions are conducted face-to-face in the 
branch network, with the risk assessment technology combining centralized credit scoring with 
decentralized loan officer discretion.  The Lender’s product offerings are somewhat differentiated 
from competitors.  Unlike many cash lenders, it does not pursue collection or collateralization 
strategies such as direct debit from paychecks, or physically keeping bank books and ATM cards of 
clients.  Its pricing is transparent and linear, with no surcharges, application fees, or insurance 
premiums added to the cost of the loan.  The Lender also has a “medium-term” product niche, with 
a 90% concentration of 4-month loans (Table 1a).  Most other cash lenders focus on 1-month or 
                                                      
9 The prevalence of for-profit institutional players makes the consumer credit market in South Africa distinct from most 
other developing countries  (Porteous 2003). 
10 There is essentially no difference between these nominal rates and corresponding real rates.  For instance, South 
African inflation was 10.2% per year from March 2002-2003, and 0.4% per year from March 2003-March 2004.   8
12+-month loans.
11  The Lender’s standard 4-month rates, absent this experiment, ranged from 
7.75% to 11.75% per month depending on observable risk, with 75% of clients in the high risk 
(11.75%) category. 
Borrowers face several incentives to repay these high-interest loans.  Carrots include 
decreasing prices and increasing future loan sizes following good repayment behavior.  Sticks 
include reporting to credit bureaus, frequent phone calls from collection agents, court summons, 
and wage garnishments. 
 
III.  Experimental Design and Implementation  
We identify specific types of asymmetric information by incorporating the random 
assignment of interest rates into the day-to-day operations of the Lender.  This section outlines the 
experimental design and implementation, describes related data collection, and validates the 
integrity of the random assignments using several statistical tests.  The methodology is 
implemented in a consumer credit market, but is applicable to other market settings as well. 
  The experiment was pilot-tested in July 2003, and then fully executed in two additional 
waves launched in September and October 2003.  We begin with a brief overview of the 
experiment, and then describe each step in detail below. 
 
A.  Design Overview 
 
First the Lender randomized interest rates attached to “pre-qualified,” limited-time offers 
that were mailed to 57,533 former clients with good repayment histories.
12  Two rates were 
                                                      
11 The Lender also has 1, 6, 12, and 18 month products, with the longer terms offered at lower rates and restricted to the 
most observably creditworthy customers. 
12 Private information may be less prevalent among past clients than new clients if hidden information is revealed through 
the lending relationship (Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004).  Hence, if this experiment were conducted on individuals with no 
prior borrowing history, one may expect larger information asymmetries.  To estimate the information asymmetries on 
such individuals, we also sent soliciations to 3,000 individuals from a mailing list purchased from a consumer database,   9
assigned to each client: an “offer rate” (r
o) included in the direct mail solicitation, and a “contract 
rate” (r
c) that was weakly less than the offer rate and revealed only after the borrower had accepted 
the solicitation and applied for a loan.  Clients did not know beforehand that the contract rate may 
be lower than the offer rate.  For 59% of the clients, the contract rate was identical to the offer rate.  
Final credit approval (i.e., the Lender’s decision on whether to offer a loan after updating the 
client’s information) and the loan size and term offered to the client were orthogonal to the 
experimental interest rates by construction.  Therefore the two interest rate randomizations enable 
us to cleanly distinguish selection effects from repayment burden effects, since some clients will 
select on different interest rates ex-ante, but then have identical repayment burdens ex-post, while 
other clients will select on the same rate ex-ante, but have different repayment burdens ex-post.
 13   
We also randomly assigned differential dynamic repayment incentives (D) in order to 
cleanly identify a moral hazard component of any repayment burden effects.  Some clients were 
assigned eligibility to receive r
c on all future loans taken within the next year (D=1), conditional on 
repayment performance, while others obtained r
c for just the first loan (D=0).  D=1 provides 
favorable pricing on future borrowing (in the 98% of cases where r
c was less than the Lender’s 
standard rate) but does not shift the cost of repaying the borrower’s initial loan taken at r
c.  Thus D 
enables us to test whether a marginal incentive, access to future financing at preferable rates, 
induces better choices related to repayment; i.e., whether D reduces any moral hazard found in this 
market.  Clients were informed of D by the branch manager after all paperwork had been 
completed and all other terms of the loan were finalized.  Figure 2 shows the experimental 
operations, step-by-step.  Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the offer rate against the contract rate for 
all individuals (41% of sample) who were assigned r
c < r
o. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
but only 1 person from this list borrowed.  A subsequent list was purchased and 5,000 letters sent (but without 
randomized interest rates) and only 2 people responded.  We return to this issue in Section VI. 
13 As detailed in Section IV, we define “repayment burden” as the reduced-form combination of several underlying moral 
hazard parameters and a wealth effect.   10
 
B.  Sample Frame 
The sample frame consisted of all individuals from 86 branches who had borrowed from 
the Lender within the past 24 months, were in good standing, and did not have a loan outstanding 
in the thirty days prior to the mailer.  Tables 1a and 1b present summary statistics on the sample 
frame and the sub-sample of clients who obtained a loan at r
c by applying before the deadline on 
their mailer.  Most notably, clients differ in observable risk as assessed by the Lender.  The Lender 
assigns prior borrowers into “low”, “medium”, and “high” risk categories, and this determines the 
borrower’s loan pricing and term options under normal operations.  The Lender does not typically 
ask clients why they seek a loan, but the experimental protocol included a survey that indicates the 
following self-reported uses: education (19%), housing renovations (11%), payoff other debt 
(11%), household consumption and/or family event (13%), funeral and medical (4%) and 
miscellaneous/unreported (32%). 
 
C.  The Randomizations 
Each client was assigned three random variables: an offer interest rate (r
o), a contract 
interest rate (r
c), and a binary variable for whether the contract rate would be valid for up to one 
year (D=1) or one loan (D=0).  Rates varied from 3.25 percent per month to 11.75 percent per 
month.
14  41% of the sample was chosen randomly and unconditionally to receive r
c<r
o (Table 1a).  
At the time of the randomization, we verified that the assigned rates were uncorrelated with other 
known information, such as credit report score.  Table 2 shows that the randomizations were 
                                                      
14 Appendix Table 1 shows the resulting r
o and r
c distributions conditional on the three observable risk categories.  Note 
these are “add-on” rates, where interest is charged upfront over the original principal balance, rather than over the 
declining balance.  We adopt the cash loan market’s convention of presenting rates in add-on, monthly form.   11
successful, ex-ante, in this fashion; i.e., conditional on the observable risk category, r
o and r
c were 
uncorrelated with other observable characteristics.
15 
Lastly, each individual was assigned to receive r
c either for one full year (D=1) or for only 
the first loan (D=0).  In the pilot and the second wave of the experiment, this randomization was 
conducted at the branch level, such that 14 branches were assigned D=0, and 10 branches were 
assigned D=1.  In the third wave, this randomization was done at the individual level.
16 
 
D.  The Offer and Loan Application Process 
The Lender mailed solicitations featuring the offer rate to 57,533 former clients.  Each 
letter had a deadline by which the individual had to respond in order to obtain r
o.  The deadline 
ranged from 2 weeks to 6 weeks, and is discussed in related research (Bertrand, Karlan, 
Mullainathan, Shafir and Zinman 2005).
17  The Lender routinely mails teasers to former borrowers 
but had never promoted specific interest rate offers before this experiment. 
Clients accepted the offer by entering a branch office and filling out an application in 
person with a loan officer.  Loan applications were taken and assessed as per the Lender’s normal 
underwriting procedures.  Specifically, loan officers: a) updated observable information and 
decided whether to offer any loan based on their updated risk assessment; b) decided the maximum 
loan size for which applicants qualified; and c) decided the longest loan term for which applicants 
qualified.  Each decision was made “blind” to the experimental rates.  Table 2 Column 5 verifies 
that the Lender’s rejection decision was in fact uncorrelated with the contract interest rate and 
                                                      
15 Column 3 shows that the dynamic repayment incentive was predicted by number of months since the last loan, the 
number of prior loans and age.  However, including controls for these variables in the primary specifications do not 
change the estimates of the effect of the dynamic incentive on default. 
16 The dynamic repayment incentive randomization was done initially at the branch level because operations personnel at 
the Lender were concerned that it would be complicated to communicate D on a case-by-case basis.  Once the branches 
were more comfortable with the experimental design, this was relaxed for the third (and largest) wave of offers. 
17 The solicitations also incorporated randomized decision frames and cues, inspired by findings from marketing and 
psychology literatures, that were designed to estimate the impact of these “behavioral” effects on consumer demand.  
These randomizations were orthogonal to the pricing randomizations examined here, by construction.   12
dynamic repayment incentive.  5,028 (8.7%) clients applied for a loan under this experiment, and 
of those 4,348 (86.5%) were approved.   
In determining maximum loan size, the Lender relies on a debt service ratio: the monthly 
payment of a loan may not exceed a certain percentage of their net monthly income.  A lower 
interest rate would thus allow for a larger loan.  A larger loan might then generate a repayment 
burden effect, which could cause a higher default rate (and bias against finding moral hazard with 
respect to the interest rate).  In order to mitigate this potential confound, the maximum allowable 
loan size was established based on the normal, not experimental, interest rates. 
The contract rate r
c was kept secret from both the loan officer and borrower until after the 
officer approved the loan application and a loan amount and term were established.
18  Special 
operations software was developed to facilitate and control this process, and we verify that this 
condition held in practice in
 Table 2, column 4 by testing that the offer rate, and not the contract 
rate (once controlling for the offer rate), predict take-up of the loan.  Once the other loan contract 
features were agreed upon, the software then revealed r
c, which was weakly less than r
o.  If the 
rates were the same, no mention was made of the second rate.  If r
c<r
o, the loan officer told the 
client that the actual interest rate was in fact lower than the initial offer.  Loan officers were 
instructed to present this as simply what the computer dictated, not as part of a special promotion 
or anything particular to the client. 
Clients then were permitted to adjust their desired loan size L following the revelation of 
r
c.  In theory endogenizing L in this fashion has implications for identifying moral hazard effects 
(since a lower r
c strengthens repayment incentives ceterus paribus, but might induce choice of a 
                                                      
18 There are several reasons to implement the contract rate assignment “double-blind”.  Most importantly, we did not 
want the contract rate to contaminate any selection effects (by influencing either credit approval, or the applicant’s 
decision whether to accept the loan offer).  The double blind device also elicits two points on the credit demand curve for 
each consumer who received r
c<r
o (Karlan and Zinman 2005).   13
higher L that weakens repayment incentives), as discussed below.  But in practice only 10% of 
borrowers changed their loan demand after r
c was revealed (Karlan and Zinman 2005).
19 
Finally, the software informed the loan officer whether the individual’s r
c was valid for one 
year (47% of borrowers obtained D=1) or for one loan (53% obtained D=0). 
 
E.  Default Outcomes 
We use three measures of default:  (1) Monthly Average Proportion Past Due (the average 
default amount in each month divided by the total debt burden), (2) Proportion of Months in 
Arrears (the number of months with positive arrearage divided by the number of months in which 
the loan was outstanding), and (3) Account in Collection Status (typically, the Lender considers a 
loan in collection status if there are three or more months of payments in arrears).  Table 1a 
presents the summary statistics on the default measures.  These measures were chosen in 
consultation with the Lender as proxies for the credit risk, collection costs, and ultimate bad debt 
incurred by the firm. 
 
IV. Theoretical Overview 
We begin by discussing the specific models of private information that motivate our 
experimental setup, and then describe how the experimental design maps into these models.  The 
Theory Appendix provides a more formal derivation. 
We test across two models of selection on unobservables:  the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) 
adverse selection model (hereafter “SW”) and the de Meza and Webb (1987; 2001) advantageous 
selection model (hereafter “DW”).
20  Specifically, r
o can produce either adverse or advantageous 
                                                      
19 On the other hand, project clients did exhibit significant interest rate elasticities with respect to r
o on both the extensive 
and intensive margins (Karlan and Zinman 2005). 
20Klonner and Rai (2004) provides a clear comparison of the Stiglitz-Weiss and de Meza-Webb models of selection.   14
selection, depending on the relationship between borrower risk and return.
21  If risk, defined from 
the Lender’s perspective as the probability of default, and borrower returns are positively 
correlated, then SW implies that higher rates induce unobservably less risky borrowers to drop out 
of the applicant pool.  Thus under adverse selection, repayment would decrease in r
o as we move 
away from the initial equilibrium.  If risk and return are negatively correlated, then DW implies 
that higher rates induce unobservably riskier borrowers to drop out of the applicant pool.  Thus 
under advantageous selection, repayment would increase in r
o as we move away from 
equilibrium.
22  In a consumer credit context, this would hold if borrowers with unobservably 
relatively unstable income view high interest rates as unaffordable.  One limitation of our setup is 
that if there are heterogeneous selection effects, such that some borrowers select adversely and 
others advantageously, then the effect of r
o will obscure the true magnitude of selection on 
unobservables.  We explore this in Section VI, although empirically, we cannot distinguish 
heterogeneous intensity of adverse selection from offsetting adverse and advantageous effects.
23 
The second randomly assigned interest rate, r
c, identifies the impact of repayment burden 
via a combination of several underlying structural parameters of interest.  Repayment burden 
incentives operate through the borrower’s project management and repayment choices.  Project 
management choices are defined as those that impact returns.  Higher interest rates will produce 
moral hazard in project choice (conditional on effort) if borrowers prefer mean-preserving spreads 
in project returns under limited liability (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).  Similarly, higher interest rates 
                                                      
21There is potentially a third type of selection based on private information, a “lemons” effect, which is unlikely to be 
important in our setting.  As described in Ausubel (1991) and elsewhere, given a setting with competitive bargaining and 
the presence of private information generated from lending relationships, a single deviating lender would find that 
reducing rates attracts ex-ante unobservably worse repayment risks, since competing lenders will match the rate reduction 
only for the better risks.  But survey evidence on pricing practices in the cash loan market shows that lenders as a rule do 
not make price concessions, even for good customers.  Note that while the lemons effect is commonly described as 
adverse selection, in our setting it is analogous to advantageous selection in the sense that reducing interest rates 
decreases profitability on the margin.  
22 de Meza and Webb (2000) shows that advantageous selection can persist in equilibrium if moral hazard prevents 
lenders from raising interest rates to clear the market. 
23 In principle the nonprice marketing randomizations discussed in Bertrand et. al. (2005) also could produce 
unobservable selection effects, but empirically they do not.   15
reduce effort (conditional on project choice), by producing debt overhang that reduces borrower 
returns in successful states (Ghosh, Mookherjee and Ray 2000).  Repayment choice simply refers 
to the fact that voluntary default (conditional on project returns) becomes more attractive under 
limited enforcement as repayment burden increases (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981; Ghosh and Ray 
2001).  In contrast, the income effect of repayment burden has nothing to do with choice: it works 
mechanically, by simply increasing the probability that a borrower with uncertain cash flow will be 
unable to repay.  Note that each of these hypothesized incentive and income effects works in the 
same direction — a higher repayment burden decreases the probability of repayment. 
These four components of repayment burden all have intuitive salience in this setting, and 
hence our priors are agnostic regarding their relative importance.  Project choice may be relatively 
limited (compared to say a pure commercial loan market), or may not — anecdotal reports suggest 
the possibility of “hidden” investment in entrepreneurial projects, and survey evidence reveals 
cross-sectional variation in the deployment of funds consistent with a range of consumption 
smoothing and human capital investment opportunities.  Debt overhang might also be less salient 
in a consumer rather than commercial credit setting, but then again the relevant effort in the 
consumer case might be related to maintaining one’s wage employment, or to obtaining credit from 
the informal sector in the event of a negative outcome.  Voluntary default might be mitigated by 
reputation effects (repeat contracting opportunities) and aggressive (if imperfect) enforcement, but 
to what extent?  The size of the income effect depends critically on the variance of borrower cash 
flows, which we do not observe. 
 
V. Empirical Strategy 
We now present the empirical strategy used to test the theoretical models and interpret the 
results of the experiment.  Recall that we identify any selection and repayment burden effects by   16
randomly assigning separate offer and contract interest rates to borrowers, conditional on 
observable risk, and then estimating the relationship between loan repayment and these rates.  We 
employ five approaches to analyzing the results: stylized comparison of means, a base-case OLS 
specification, a semi-parametric matching estimator, instrumental variables, and non-parametric 
plots. 
Abstracting from functional form considerations for the moment, our basic empirical 
model takes the form: 
(1)  Yi = f(ri
o, ri
c, Di, Xi)  
where i indexes borrowers.  Y is a measure of repayment; r
o is the rate offered on the mail 
solicitation; and r
c  ≤ r
o is the rate actually contracted upon loan approval.  D is the randomly 
dynamic repayment incentive (or lack thereof), with D=1 if r
c is valid for up to one year (if the 
borrower stays current), and D=0 if r
c applies to one loan only.  X always includes the Lender’s 
summary measure of observable risk (since the interest rates were randomized conditional on this 
measure), and also may include other readily observable characteristics that the Lender could use 
for screening. 
The Theory Appendix shows formally that: 
•  r
o identifies the selection effect conditional on r
c  -- with dY/dr
o>0 if there is adverse 
selection on net, and dY/dr
o<0  if there is advantageous selection on net. 
•  r
c identifies the repayment burden effect conditional on r
o — with dY/dr
c>0 if there is such 
an effect. 
 
Stylized Comparison of Means: Table 3 
We classify rates into “high” and “low” groups, a la Figure 1.  This is done by setting 
cutoffs at the median experimental rates for each observable risk category.  Table 3 presents mean   17
comparisons using this method.  The findings preview the regression results: we find occasional 
evidence of adverse selection and repayment burden in the full sample, and more robust evidence 
for adverse selection among female borrowers and repayment burden among male borrowers. 
 
OLS Specification: Tables 4 and 5 
Our base specification is a linear model estimated using OLS: 
(2)  Yi = α + βori
o + βcri
c + βwDi + χXi  + εib 
i again indexes borrowers, and βo, βc, and βw are the estimates of the selection effect, the repayment 
burden effect, and the dynamic incentive effect, respectively.  X need include only the Lender’s 
summary measure of observable risk since the randomizations conditioned only on this variable.  
We also include fixed effects for the month in which the offer letter was sent (June, September, or 
October 2003).  The error term, εib, is corrected for clustering at the branch level, b.  The model is 
estimated on the takeup sample of 4,348 observations since these are the only project clients for 
whom we observe repayment behavior.  The OLS results are robust to including loan size and term 
as control variables, which is noteworthy since loan size responds to the interest rate (Karlan and 
Zinman 2005) and could have an independent effect on default.  Results obtained with the OLS 
estimator are similar to the comparison of means, and are presented in Tables 4 and 5 and 
discussed in Section VI. 
 
Semi-Parametric Matching Estimator: Table 6 
Next we develop a semi-parametric approach that resembles a matching estimator, but with 
a continuous treatment variable.  This is motivated by the concern that the OLS specification will 
impose incorrect functional form assumptions if any of the three different random variables interact 
to influence default.  We address this possibility using three related specifications that impose   18
functional form assumptions on only one random variable at a time, while conditioning non-
parametrically on all combinations of the other two random variables and observable risk.  For 
example, to identify the selection effect (r
o), we group observations that match perfectly on the 
other random variables (r
c and D) and the risk level, and employ a fixed effect model that de-means 
the dependent variable (default) and the variable of interest (in this case r
o) within these perfectly-
matched groups.  This model is shown is equation (3) below, and then we present the analogous 
models for identifying the repayment burden effect and dynamic incentive effect in equations (4) 
and (5), respectively.  In each of these formulas the subscript “c” represents contract interest rate, 
“o” represents offer interest rate, “d” represents the dynamic incentive, and “r” represents the 
lender-defined categorical risk level (high, medium or low).  The unit of observation is i, the 
individual borrower.  The month of the offer letter, M,  is a categorical variable (either July, 
September or October, 2003). 
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Table 6 presents the estimates obtained using these three specifications.  The results are discussed 
in Section VI. 
 
Instrumental Variables Estimator: Table 7 
  Lastly, we consider the case where repayment burden is defined as total interest due on the 
loan, not merely the marginal cost of debt (the interest rate).  Total interest due includes an 
endogenous  component (loan size) multiplied by a random variable (the interest rate), so we 
employ an instrumental variables approach to identify the effect of loan pricing on default.     19
Specifically, we use the random variables to instrument for endogenous variable of interest, debt 
burden.  The instrumental variable specification is: 








C are the endogenous variables, total interest due under the offer and contract 




























c serving as instrumental variables for I
0 and I
C. 
These results are presented in Table 7 and discussed in the next section. 
 
Plot of Coefficients: Figures 4-11 
In figures 4-11 we relax the linear treatment effect assumptions imposed by (2)-(8) using a 
nonparametric graphical approach described in Section VI, part D. 
 
VI.  Empirical Results 
A.  Overview of Base Specification 
 
Our primary analysis estimates equation (2) using ordinary least squares, tobit, or probit on 
the “full” sample containing all three observable risk categories (Table 4).
24  The dependent 
variables are the three default measures described above.  In all specifications, the interest rate 
                                                      
24 Results are robust to including the log of loan size, and loan term, to address the possibility of interest rate effecting 
repayment through its effect on loan size and term.  An alternative, instrumental variables approach is presented in Table 
7.  This too yields qualitatively similar results.  Nor do results change if we include branch fixed effects to control for any 
differences in experimental implementation and/or the mechanical influence of varying mailer dates (staggered by groups 
of branches) on repayment measures.  Pooling the risk categories implies that the full sample model lacks a common 
support for interest rates exceeding 7.75 (since, e.g., low risk borrowers are never offered a rate above 7.75).  We re-
estimate our base specifications over a common support and report qualitatively similar results in Appendix Table 2, 
although much power is lost on the smaller sample size.   20
units are in monthly percentage points (e.g., 7.50 for 7.50% per month), and we report marginal 
effects where applicable.  Results on interest rate variables therefore capture the effect of a one 
percentage point (100 basis points) increase in the monthly rate.  We find evidence of moral hazard 
through the dynamic pricing incentive D, but little suggestion of any selection on unobservables in 
the full sample. 
 
B.  Primary Results with the Base Specification 
 
Row 1 of Table 4 presents estimates of βo, the response of repayment behavior to the offer 
rate.  This coefficient identifies any net selection on unobservables, with βo>0 indicating adverse 
selection, and βo<0 indicating advantageous selection.  We find no robust evidence in either 
direction on the full sample.
25 
Row 2 of Table 4 presents estimates of βc, the response of repayment behavior to the 
contract rate.  This coefficient identifies any effect of repayment burden, with βc>0 indicating some 
combination of moral hazard and wealth effects.  Similar to the adverse selection results, we find 
consistently positive effects that are typically insignificant statistically.  The one marginally 
significant result (column 2) implies that a 400 basis point cut would reduce the average number of 
months in arrears by 13%.
26  
Results on D, the dynamic repayment incentive variable, deliver robust evidence of moral 
hazard (Table 4, row 3).  Recall that clients with D=1 face a marginal incentive to repay — if they 
maintain good standing with the Lender they are eligible to borrow at r
c for up to a year.  D 
consequently has no effect on the debt burden of the current loan, but does increase the benefit of 
                                                      
25 Recall from Section IV that the offer rate coefficient will understate the true extent of private information problems if 
there are concurrent adverse and advantegeous selection effects in the sample.  This would manifest as parameter 
heterogeneity; e.g., if part of the sample has βo<0, and part of the sample has βo>0.  We explored this possibility by 
interacting the offer rate variable with various demographics (see, e.g., Table 8), and found some evidence that adverse 
selection was decreasing in income.  Splitting the sample into income quintiles or at the median (not reported), we found 
that only one of the six offer rate coefficients had the negative sign consistent with advantageous selection, and that this 
coefficient was not statistically significant (t-stat = 0.6). 
26 Coefficient * 4 / mean outcome = 0.007 * 4 / 0.219 = 13%   21
maintaining a good relationship with the lender by reducing the interest rate on future loans.  D 
therefore is free of the noise (bad shocks) and confound (endogenous loan size) that might bias 
estimates of the reduced-form repayment burden effect toward zero.  D thus identifies pure moral 
hazard that is alleviated by the provision of a marginal, dynamic repayment incentive.  D’s effect is 
large and significant, with the incentive producing decreases in the various default measures 
ranging from 1.1 to 1.9 percentage points in the OLS specifications on the full sample.  These 
magnitudes imply that D=1 clients defaulted 7 to 16 percent less often than the mean borrower.  
Table 4 (Columns 2, 4 & 6) also shows that this effect is increasing in and driven by the size of the 
discount on future loans, as each 100 basis point decrease in the price of future loans reduces 
default by 4% in the full sample.  
Table 5 shows the primary results from Table 4, but by gender.  Recall from the 
introduction that gender differences in response to liquidity and incentives have been documented 
in several other settings, and that differential response to interest rates are of particular interest to 
development economists and microfinance practitioners.  In keeping with conventional wisdom, we 
find evidence of moral hazard (but not adverse selection) for males.  Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, we find adverse selection (but not moral hazard) for females. 
Table 5, Columns 1 through 6 show the results for male borrowers.  We find evidence of 
moral hazard but no selection on unobservables.  Both experimental instruments for moral hazard, 
the contract rate and the dynamic repayment incentive (D), are large and sometimes significant 
determinants of default.  The coefficient on the offer rate is relatively small and always 
insignificant. 
Table 5, Columns 7 through 12 show a different pattern for female borrowers.  We find 
evidence of adverse selection but no repayment burden or moral hazard effects.  The offer rate 
coefficient is always large and positive for females, and statistically significant in 5 of the 6 
regressions reported, indicating adverse selection.  On the other hand, the contract rate coefficient   22
is now wrong-signed (and significant in one case).  The dynamic repayment incentive results are 
insignificant, but signed negatively (evidence for moral hazard) and often large economically.  On 
balance then there is no statistically significant evidence for repayment burden or moral hazard 
influencing the repayment behavior of female borrowers. 
In specifications not shown, we test whether the gender effects are significantly different 
from each other by including gender interaction terms in the Table 4 specifications.  The 
interaction term is significant statistically for both the offer and contract interest rates, but not for 
the dynamic repayment incentive variable.  This is not surprising, since the coefficient on the 
dynamic repayment incentive for women is negative and similar (slightly smaller) to that for men, 
just not significant statistically. 
 
C.  Primary Results with Matching Estimator and IV Specification 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the semi-parametric matching estimator specified in 
equations (3)-(5).  The point estimates remain largely the same as in the OLS results shown in 
Table 5, but the standard errors are slightly larger due to the loss of hundreds of degrees of 
freedom. 
Table 7 presents the results of the IV estimator outlined in equations (6)-(8).  These follow 
a similar pattern to the results obtained from the base specification (Tables 4 and 5), with the 
exception that we now find more weakly significant evidence for adverse selection.  (As before, 
however, the significant full sample results appear to be driven by females.)  Results from 
estimating the endogenous version of the IV estimator (second panel of Table 7) suggest that using 
total interest cost (or debt burden) as the regressor can lead to misleading inferences in cases where 
exogenous variation is not available.  We surmise that the difficulty stems from the fact that lower 
interest rates-- i.e., a lower marginal cost of borrowing-- produce demand for larger loan sizes   23
(Karlan and Zinman 2005), and hence a larger total cost of borrowing.  Recall that our IV estimator 
surmounts this problem by instrumenting for the total cost of borrowing with our randomly 
assigned marginal cost of borrowing. 
  
D.  Graphs  
Figures 4-11 show smoothed plots of coefficients from a non-parametric estimator that 
relaxes the linear treatment effect assumption maintained in all of our regression specifications.  
Each plot has one random variable of interest; e.g., in Figure 4 this variable is the offer rate.  The 
estimates of interest are the coefficients on the each individual offer rate (e.g., one cell for 7.25, 
another for 7.5).  The specifications include controls (again, non-parametric) for the contract 
interest rate, risk category and month of the offer.  The plots reproduce the qualitative patterns 
(sign and magnitudes) found in our regressions, but are not conclusive in the sense that the 




E.  Gender Analysis  
 
Next, we explore whether the gender effects are actually driven by systematic variation in 
household demographics rather than something unobservable and/or fundamental to gender per se.  
Such compositional confounds could be driven by differential demand or supply, although in the 
case of supply, the Lender does not explicitly use gender in their screening of clients.  Tables 1a 
and 1b show that there are minimal observable compositional differences across gender.  A 
parsimonious test (shown in Table 8) for compositional confounds is to add interactions between 
the interest rate variables and observable characteristics to our base specification.  The significant 
interaction terms between gender and the rate variables, conditional on other demographics (and 
their interactions with rates and gender), suggest that gender differences are not merely driven by 
                                                      
27 The confidence bands on these plots were created by bootstrapping with 500 replications.   24
mechanical composition effects.  We continue to find strong repayment burden effects among 
males, and strong adverse selection effects among females.  None of the demographic interaction 
effects are significant, nor do they detract from the simple gender interaction effects with rates.  If, 
for instance, the gender effect was masking a “female and married” effect, then we would observe a 
significant “married and offer rate” interaction and the gender interaction with the offer rate would 
go to zero. 
A related check is to predict default using observable demographic information, and then 
test whether observable selection on the interest rate differs across males and females.  If 
unobservably riskier women are more likely to borrow at high interest rates, one should also find 
that observably riskier women are also more likely to borrow at high interest rates.  Observable risk 
is defined here as the predicted probability of default.  Table 9 shows that the effect of the 
interaction between observable risk and the offer rate on the decision to apply is significant and 
positive for women, but not for men.  This means that the price elasticity of the application 
decision is decreasing in observable risk for women but not for men, and provides further 
confirmation of a gender difference that is not driven purely by other observable characteristics. 
Of course we do not observe all of the observable characteristics of interest; e.g., we do not 
have independent measures of education and occupation, nor do we observe health status, 
unmarried co-habitation or head-of-household.  Hence the above tests do not completely rule out 
the possibility that relatively mechanical demographic differences generate the observed gender 
pattern. 
On balance, however, the evidence suggests that male and female borrowers do pose 
different types of private information problems for the Lender, with strong evidence that females 
select adversely and some evidence that male repayment is relatively sensitive to repayment 
burden.  The question of what drives this pattern (e.g., demographics, outside credit options, social 
norms, hard-wiring....) merits further, more systematic, exploration.   25
 
 
F.  Observable Determinants of Default and Selection on Observables 
Significant interactions between interest rates and observable characteristics beg the related 
question of how efficiently the Lender assesses risk.  We begin by exploring whether observable 
characteristics help predict default, conditional on the Lender’s summary statistic for risk, by 
reporting results obtained from adding several additional observables to equation (2).  Table 10 
shows that the Lender’s summary statistic for observable risk does not in fact completely 
summarize the role of observables, at least over the range of interest rates used in our experiment, 
as several readily observed variables help predict default.  Significant predictors include credit 
scores and the number of prior transactions with the Lender.  However, adding observables beyond 
the summary statistic generates little or no improvements in the overall explanatory power of the 
models (as measured by the adjusted R-squareds in Tables 4 and 10). 
   
G.  External Validity and the Power of Repeated Transactions 
We may find little evidence of adverse selection in the full sample because our borrowers 
have already revealed their types to the Lender; i.e., in the process of transacting, private 
information becomes public.
28  We explore this possibility indirectly, and within-sample, by 
exploring whether the offer rate effect varies with the number of prior loans the borrower has taken 
from the Lender.  Table 11 shows that this is indeed the case: adding a prior loans main effect and 
interaction with r
o to equation (2) produces a negative and significant interaction term.  The 
interaction effect is large; e.g., it eliminates 43% of adverse selection at the mean number of prior 
loans (4.3) in the full sample.  Thus selection is indeed relatively more adverse for those borrowers 
                                                      
28 We sought to include clients with no prior relationship with the Lender by extending 3,000 offers to names obtained 
from a mailing list; unfortunately, the list yielded only one borrower.  A pilot follow-up list of 5,000 offers (without 
randomization of interest rates) yielded two borrowers.  Hence, in order to conduct this experiment on “new” clients, we 
need to find an alternative channel for identifying the sample frame and contact information.   26
with whom the Lender is least familiar.  The repayment burden effect (through the contract interest 
rate) appears to decrease with prior transaction frequency as well.  Moral hazard (as identified by 
the dynamic repayment incentive), on the other hand, abates only a little.  Note, however, that we 
should not conclude that the relationship caused the information asymmetries to abate.  Rather, if 
those with more frequent transaction histories are simply less able or willing to exploit information 
asymmetries, then we also would find negative coefficients on the interactions between interest rate 
and prior borrowing frequency.  In other words, we can not distinguish whether it is the frequent 
borrowers’ “type” or the relationship itself that drives the results.  Think of implementing our 
experiment on the most frequent borrowers, but years ago, before their first loan with the Lender.  
If their “type” is driving today’s behavior, then this initial experiment also would have found no 
evidence of adverse selection or moral hazard.  Repeated experiments, and panel data, would help 
identify the causal effects of lending relationships. 
 
H.  Magnitude Calculations Comparing Observables and Unobservable Effects 
 
We now estimate the relative importance of private vs. public information in determining 
default.  Recall that the Lender uses the three-tiered risk category to determine interest rates, and 
that the high risk clients can borrow at 11.75% per month and the low risk clients borrow at 7.75% 
per month.  We pose the question: how much of the reduced default observed between high and 
low risk clients is due to the unobservable selection and incentive effects generated by lowering the 
interest rate by 4.00% per month, and how much is due to the observable characteristics that 
allowed the lender to classify the clients as such.  High risk clients have much higher default rates: 
e.g., a 22 percentage point higher proportion of months in arrears than low risk clients (27   27
percentage points for men, and 17 percentage points for women).
29  We take this observable 
difference and calculate how much of it appears to be due to information asymmetries with respect 
to interest rates.  The remainder is due to the observable characteristics that led the lender to 
classify the clients into high and risk categories.  The point estimates suggest that this interest rate 
reduction alone will produce a 5.6 percentage point drop in default among men, through reduced 
repayment burden (Table 5, Column 2), and a 3.2 percentage point drop among women due to 
reduced adverse selection (Table 5, Column 8).
30  Given a disparity between high and low risk 
default rates of 27 percentage points for men and 17 for women, information asymmetries with 
respect to the interest rate explain about 20% of differential default rate between the Lender’s high 
and low risk clients (5.6%/27% for men; 3.2%/17% for women). 
 
VII. Conclusion 
We develop a new market field experiment methodology that disentangles adverse 
selection from moral hazard.  The experiment is implemented in a South African consumer credit 
market, and yields evidence of moral hazard among males and adverse selection among females.  
This confirms the conventional wisdom on moral hazard in microfinance, but raises a new puzzle 
for theorists and practitioners: why do we only see adverse selection among women?  The moral 
hazard finding, taken alone, could be driven by a lower cost of default for men than for women.  
This could occur if men had better outside options, or different social norms and values regarding 
default and/or smoothing bad shocks (by, e.g., drawing on family and community resources).   
However, the lower-cost-of-default story does not square well with our finding that only women 
                                                      
29 In our sample, there is a 22 percentage point difference in default between high and low risks among borrowers who 
obtained rates within 100 basis points of the Lender’s normal rate for their risk class.  The unadjusted mean difference in 
our sample is 15.0 percentage points (Table 1a). 
30 The percentage point reduction is calculated by multiplying the coefficient on the interest rate variable (contract rate in 
the case of men, offer rate in the case of women) by the normal interest rate spread between low and high risk clients (4 
percentage points).  Estimates are generally smaller (or zero) if we calibrate on the full sample, although the result on the 
size of the dynamic repayment incentive (“Rate valid for one year * points below the normal rate”) for the proportion-of-
months-in-arrears measure suggests a 3.2 percentage point reduction in default (Table 4, Column 4).     28
exhibit adverse selection, since men facing relatively low costs of default should select adversely as 
well if screening is imperfect (and it is, as evidenced by the adverse selection among women).  
Hence the finding the men commit moral hazard and women engage in adverse selection poses a 
difficult puzzle that motivates further research, both empirical and theoretical. 
In the full sample, our findings aggregate to robust evidence for moral hazard and weak 
evidence for adverse selection.  We also find evidence suggesting that asymmetric information 
problems are mitigated if there are prior loan transactions—a lending “relationship”, in banking 
and finance parlance—between the borrower and Lender.  Where statistically significant, the 
effects of private information are economically important: our results indicate that adverse 
selection and moral hazard explain about 20% of default in our sample.  Overall the findings 
provide unique empirical evidence of significant, specific information asymmetries in a consumer 
credit market, and thus help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that 
specializes in financing high-risk borrowers at very high rates. 
These findings should translate into policy and practical implications with future research.  
The presence of empirically importance information asymmetries indicates the potential for 
welfare-enhancing investments in screening and monitoring technologies on the margin.   
Inframarginally, it suggests that loan production innovations ranging from credit scoring to group 
lending have helped drive credit market development by mitigating information problems.  But 
more work is needed to identify the prevalence or absence of asymmetric information in different 
settings and markets.  For example, we are currently planning additional experiments, in the lab 
and in the field, to test the robustness of our gender effects and explore underlying mechanisms 
driving those results.
31 
                                                      
31 The results also motivate additional data collection on, for example, the incidence of bad shocks by gender.  In a brief 
phone survey, reaching 374 former borrowers of the Lender (including 61 defaulters), we found no differential incidence 
of adverse shocks.   29
Development finance, over the past thirty years, has seen a plethora of interventions 
intended to help overcome presumed information asymmetries; e.g., group liability rules 
(Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005).  Lenders can best design such interventions if they 
are equipped with better information about the nature and importance of any information 
asymmetries.  However, optimal policy design requires the identification of additional parameters, 
including the relative effectiveness of different interventions at mitigating information problems, 
and the marginal (rationed) borrower’s returns to borrowing.  Our study has provided unique, 
micro-foundation evidence for specific information asymmetries.  Combining this type of finding 
with further research on specific interventions and potential borrower returns will produce specific 
policy prescriptions. 
   30
Theory Appendix 
 
Here is a more formal derivation of how our research design maps into theoretical models of 
private information, and thereby permits identification of unobservable selection and moral hazard 
effects. 
 
Assume a Lender implementing our experiment is faced with loan applicants who have identical 
observable characteristics but may be heterogeneous with respect to unobservable information.  
These characteristics q are not observable to the Lender, but are known to the applicant.  Let q 
(“riskiness”) be continuous, and bounded below by zero:  )} , 0 [ , { ∞ ∈ = q q Q , where a higher q 
negatively impacts but does not wholly determine the “success” of the borrower’s project, which is 
defined discretely.  The success/fail framework is more typically applied to a pure commercial 
credit market, but it also makes sense in a consumer credit setting.  Here we can think of “success” 
as having sufficient funds to repay the consumer loan, whether these funds are from entrepreneurial 
activity, wage income, or other financing sources.  Borrowers succeed with probability p(q, e) and 
fail with probability 1-p(q,e), where e  is effort exerted by the agent.  We allow effort to be 
continuous,  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ e , and assume it imposes a linear cost. 
 
We assume that p is twice continuously differentiable in effort, and differentiable with respect to 
the common shock and the unobservable risk q.  Next we impose the following standard 
assumptions on the probability structure: 
Assumption 1.
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i.e., the probability of success decreases with riskiness, q; the probability of success increases with 
borrower’s effort, e; and, the probability of success with respect to effort, e, decreases with 
riskiness, q  (and vice versa). 
 
Next assume for simplicity that the return to the borrower is R(q) in the event of success and zero 
in the event of failure.  We assume for the moment that returns are observable and verifiable, 
thereby abstracting from the possibility of voluntary default (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981; Ghosh and 
Ray 2001).  Then default occurs if and only if the project doesn’t succeed under the additional 
simplifying assumption that:  
 
Assumption 2.  . ) 1 ( ) ( : B r q R Q q
c + > ∈ ∀  
 
Where B is the loan principal amount demanded and r
c is the interest rate on the loan contract.  So 
a borrower repays in full if her project succeeds and repays nothing if her project fails.  
 
We now show that the assumption on the relationship between risk (to the Lender) and returns (to 
the borrowers) is critical to identifying any selection effects of interest rates.  Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) shows that adverse selection results if this relationship is positive. Formally, 
 
Assumption 3a (“SW”).   ). ( ) ' ( ) , ' ( ) ( ) , ( : ' , e C q R e q p q R e q p Q q q = = ∈ ∀  
Where C is a constant.  The equation states that expected returns to the borrower are constant— 
projects that yield high returns in the successful state have low probabilities of success.  We show 
below that this condition will indeed produce adverse selection in our setting. 
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De Meza and Webb (1987) shows that advantageous selection results if risk and returns are 
negatively correlated.  Formally: 
 
Assumption 3b (“DW”).  ). ' ( ) , ' ( ) ( ) , ( ' : ' , q R e q p q R e q p q q Q q q < ⇔ > ∈ ∀  
 
This will hold, e.g., if borrowers differ only in the probability of project success, but not in project 
payoff conditional on success.  We show below that in our setting 3b implies that raising the 
interest rate discourages low quality borrowers on the margin, thereby improving the average 
composition of the borrower pool via advantageous selection.   
 
We solve for selection and moral hazard effects by focusing on the borrower’s problem.  Define the 
borrower’s expected return (after the effort choice is made) as: 
  
e B r q R e q p E
c − + − = ] ) 1 ( ) ( )[ , ( ) (    ) 1 ( π  
 
The Lender does not negotiate on price in either standard or experimental operations, so borrowers 
are price takers at r.  We ignore the Lender’s problem since in our setting the interest rate is not a 
choice variable (it was randomly assigned), and the variables the Lender does control (loan supply 
on the extensive and intensive margins) are orthogonal to the rate by construction.  Therefore we 
can assume (without loss of generality) that applicants are approved by the Lender.
32  
 
Accordingly we return to the borrower’s problem and begin by solving the model through 
backwards induction; i.e., conditional on the borrower deciding to apply, she decides upon the 
                                                      
32 In practice, 84% of applicants were approved in the experiment.  More generally, one can think of any rejected 
borrowers as being observably differentiated— and this model conditions on observable information.    33
repayment effort after learning the contract interest rate, r
c.  Note the interest rate that the agent 
takes into account is the contract rate, not the offer rate (in the case where they differ).  Therefore, 
holding riskiness, q, fixed, the agent solves 
e B r q R e q p
c
e − + − ] ) 1 ( ) ( )[ , ( max    ) 2 (  
Given our set of assumptions, the optimization program yields a unique interior solution for each 
value of q and is characterized by the following first-order condition: 
.
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Proposition 1. The level of effort chosen is inferior to the first-best value (that is, when effort is 
observable and verifiable).  Moreover, note that  . 0 / ~ < ∂ ∂
c r e  This is the debt overhang version of 
moral hazard effect -- the higher the interest rate, the less the optimal effort since the agent only 
receives a positive return in case of success (i.e., the return function is convex).  Proof is at the end 
of this Appendix.  In this setup, a voluntary default model would yield qualitatively identical 
results regarding the relationship between repayment and r
c (Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) or Ghosh, 
Mookherjee et al (2000)).  
   
The next step in solving the borrower’s problem is to examine the decision to apply for the loan, 
which is made using the offer rate, r
o.  (Recall from Section III that borrowers are not aware that 
there might be a distinct contract rate, r
c, when they are deciding whether to apply for the loan.)  
Define the marginal applicant as the one who has expected returns of exactly zero.  That is,  
. 0 ) ( ] ) 1 ( ) ˆ ( ))[ ( , ˆ ( : ˆ    ) 4 ( = − + −
o o o r e B r q R r e q p q  
 
Proposition 2. If the SW assumption (3a) holds, the agent applies for a loan if  . ˆ q q ≥  Moreover, 
an infinitesimal increase in r
o increases the marginal borrower’s q,  . 0 / ˆ > ∂ ∂
o r q   (There is no   34
effect through effort since it is endogenous, and the marginal effect is zero by the envelope 
theorem).  Therefore when the offer rate increases the marginal applicant is riskier; i.e., the safer 
borrowers choose not to apply, creating a pool that is riskier on average.  This is the classic adverse 
selection effect a la SW.  If instead the DW assumption (3b) holds, the agent applies if  q q ~ ≤ .  In 
this case  , 0 / ~ < ∂ ∂
o r q ; i.e., increasing the offer rate decreases the marginal applicant’s riskiness, 
q, and the applicant pool becomes less risky on average.  This is advantageous selection a la DW.  
(See the end of this Appendix for proofs.) 
 
We can now tie our propositions regarding the selection effects of the offer interest rate, r
o, and the 
moral hazard effect of the contract interest rate, r
c, directly to an empirical outcome of interest, the 
probability of default.  According to the model, the expected probability of default, once r
c is 
known and effort is chosen, can be expressed as: 
.
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Proposition 3.  The marginal effect of r
o on the default probability captures the effect of selection.  
If the SW assumption holds, then: 
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The proof is a direct application of proposition 2.  If instead the DW assumption holds then the 
effect of a marginal change in the offer rate on the estimated probability of default has a negative 
sign. 
 
On the other hand the marginal effect of r
c will capture the moral hazard effect,   35
. 0
) ˆ ( 1
) ( ~ ) ~ , ( ) default   of y  probabilit (




















The result is again immediate since, by proposition 1,  . 0 / ~ < ∂ ∂
c r e  
 
Incorporating the dynamic repayment incentive (D) is no different substantively than increasing the 
benefits of repayment, holding the costs constant.  This additional repayment incentive may inspire 
more effort to ensure a successful outcome (mitigating debt overhang) or simply more incentive to 
choose to repay the first loan (discouraging voluntary default).  Incorporating this into the above, 
we add D to formula 2 as a benefit which accrues to the borrower if they repay the first loan: 
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So D increases effort and hence reduces default. 
  
Proof of Proposition 1. 
To show that the effort level is lower than the first-best level of effort, begin by noting that in a 
first-best setting where effort is observable and verifiable to all parties the first-order condition 
reads: 
) (
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The right-hand side of this first-order condition is smaller than the one for which effort is 
unobservable, making the optimal effort level larger due to decreasing returns in effort.  To show 
the moral hazard effect,  , 0 / ~ <





















since the returns to effort are decreasing. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Assume the SW assumption (3a) holds.  Recall that the marginal borrower’s return once the offer 
rate is announced is, by definition, zero. Since the expected returns are increasing in q only 
applicants with q’s higher than marginal borrower’s q ˆ  are going to have nonnegative expected 
returns.  Accordingly these borrowers, with  q q ˆ > , form the pool of applicants. 
 
Totally differentiating the marginal applicant condition yields: 
, 0

















since p is decreasing in unobservable risk q. If instead the DW assumption (3b) holds the steps are 
the same but the signs are the opposite. In particular expected returns are decreasing in q and so 
only safer projects than the marginal q apply.  In this case the total differentiation produces: 
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o  Q.E.D.   37
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Figure 2: Operational Steps of Experiment 
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Plot includes only the 41% of borrowers that received a contract rate less than the offer rate.   40
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Coefficients for Offer Interest Rate Indicator Variables
95% Confidence Interval
Specification Includes Contract Rate Non-Parametrically
OLS, Smoothed Plot of Coefficients on Offer Rate
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Coefficients for Offer Interest Rate Indicator Variables
95% Confidence Interval
Specification Includes Contract Rate Non-Parametrically
OLS, Smoothed Plot of Coefficients on Offer Rate




These are smoothed plots of the coefficients on the offer rate indicator variables (y-axis), for each individual 
offer rate (x-axis), for females.  The dependent variable is default, measured as the average past due amount 
as a proportion of original principal (on the left graph) and as the proportion of months in arrears (on the 
right graph).  Other independent variables include contract rate indicator variables (grouped by integer to 
preserve degrees of freedom), the lender-defined risk level, and the month of the offer.  The upward slope is 
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Coefficients for Contract Interest Rate Indicator Variables
95% Confidence Interval
Specification Includes Offer Rate Non-Parametrically
OLS, Smoothed Plot of Coefficients on Contract Rate
Outcome: Monthly Average Proportion Past Due
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Coefficients for Contract Interest Rate Indicator Variables
95% Confidence Interval
Specification Includes Offer Rate Non-Parametrically
OLS, Smoothed Plot of Coefficients on Contract Rate
Outcome: Proportion of Months in Arrears
Repayment Burden Effects, Female
 
 
These are smoothed plots of the coefficients on the contract rate indicator variables (y-axis), for each 
individual contract rate (x-axis), for females.  The dependent variable is default, measured as the average past 
due amount as a proportion of original principal (on the left graph) and as the proportion of months in 
arrears (on the right graph).  Other independent variables include offer rate indicator variables (grouped by 
integer to preserve degrees of freedom), the lender-defined risk level, and the month of the offer.  The flat 
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Coefficients for Offer Interest Rate Indicator Variables
95% Confidence Interval
Specification Includes Contract Rate Non-Parametrically
OLS, Smoothed Plot of Coefficients on Offer Rate







































































2 4 6 8 10 12
Coefficients for Offer Interest Rate Indicator Variables
95% Confidence Interval
Specification Includes Contract Rate Non-Parametrically
OLS, Smoothed Plot of Coefficients on Offer Rate




These are smoothed plots of the coefficients on the offer rate indicator variables (y-axis), for each individual 
offer rate (x-axis), for males.  The dependent variable is default, measured as the average past due amount as 
a proportion of original principal (on the left graph) and as the proportion of months in arrears (on the right 
graph).  Other independent variables include contract rate indicator variables (grouped by integer to preserve 
degrees of freedom), the lender-defined risk level, and the month of the offer.  The flat slope is indicative of 
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Coefficients for Contract Interest Rate Indicator Variables
95% Confidence Interval
Specification Includes Offer Rate Non-Parametrically
OLS, Smoothed Plot of Coefficients on Contract Rate
Outcome: Monthly Average Proportion Past Due
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Coefficients for Contract Interest Rate Indicator Variables
95% Confidence Interval
Specification Includes Offer Rate Non-Parametrically
OLS, Smoothed Plot of Coefficients on Contract Rate
Outcome: Proportion of Months in Arrears
Repayment Burden Effects, Male
 
 
These are smoothed plots of the coefficients on the contract rate indicator variables (y-axis), for each 
individual contract rate (x-axis), for males.  The dependent variable is default, measured as the average past 
due amount as a proportion of original principal (on the left graph) and as the proportion of months in 
arrears (on the right graph).  Other independent variables include offer rate indicator variables (grouped by 
integer to preserve degrees of freedom), the lender-defined risk level, and the month of the offer.  The 
upward slope is indicative of a repayment burden effect with respect to the interest rate. 
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Low     
Risk
A. Full Sample
# of months since last loan 10.3 5.9 6.0 5.8 10.6 12.7 2.8 2.8
(6.9) (5.8) (5.8) (5.8) (6.8) (6.1) (1.7) (1.6)
Size of last loan prior to project (Rand) 1116.4 1156.0 1161.4 1150.9 1113.1 1086.4 1176.5 1229.7
(829.9) (825.7) (798.2) (851.6) (830.2) (785.2) (878.4) (994.5)
# of prior loans with the lender 4.3 4.9 4.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 5.7 6.6
(3.9) (4.2) (4.2) (4.2) (3.8) (3.5) (4.2) (4.3)
1 or 2 months 1,656 132 54 78 1,524 1,407 93 156
2.88% 3.04% 2.53% 3.52% 2.87% 3.26% 1.50% 1.92%
4 months 53,296 3,939 1,926 2,013 49,357 40,687 5,658 6,951
92.64% 90.59% 90.30% 90.88% 92.80% 94.18% 91.17% 85.54%
6 months 2,030 223 123 100 1,807 887 369 774
3.53% 5.13% 5.77% 4.51% 3.40% 2.05% 5.95% 9.52%
12 months 551 54 30 24 497 220 86 245
0.96% 1.24% 1.41% 1.08% 0.93% 0.51% 1.39% 3.02%
Number of Observations 57,533 4,348 2,133 2,215 53,185 43,201 6,206 8,126
B. Randomized Variables
Offer Interest Rate 7.88 7.18 7.16 7.22 7.94 8.10 7.20 5.73
(2.42) (2.30) (2.32) (2.29) (2.42) (2.48) (1.85) (1.36)
Contract Interest Rate 7.08 6.53 6.46 6.58 7.12 7.29 6.56 5.28
(2.42) (2.26) (2.25) (2.27) (2.42) (2.52) (1.87) (1.34)
Proportion Receiving Rate for One year (vs. one loan) 0.43 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.48
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Proportion Receiving a Contract Rate < Offer Rate 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.39
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
C. Default Measure
Monthly Average Past Due Amount 152.56 131.10 173.21 180.13 224.49 57.40
(359.28) (337.39) (378.09) (404.86) (408.52) (181.67)
Monthly Avg Past Due Amount, Proportion of Principal 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.03
(0.21) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.11)
Proportion of Months With Some Arrearage 0.22 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.10
(0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.19)
Account is in Collection (3+ months arrears) 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.04
(0.32) (0.30) (0.33) (0.35) (0.38) (0.19)
Number of Observations 57,533 4,348 2,133 2,215 53,185 2,090 941 1,317
Money amounts in South African Rand, ~7.5 Rand = US $1 at the time of the experiment.
Table 1a: Summary Statistics 
Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Term of last loan prior to project






Female, proportion 0.48 1010
(0.50) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Married, proportion 0.44 0.37 0.50 0.39 0.52
(0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
# of dependents 1.59 1.53 1.64 1.82 1.97
(1.74) (1.62) (1.85) (1.61) (1.87)
Age 41.25 42.03 40.55 41.74 40.10
(11.53) (11.89) (11.14) (11.38) (10.82)
Education (# of years, estimated from occupation) 6.78 7.23 6.36 7.45 6.53
(3.32) (3.45) (3.14) (3.51) (3.19)
Monthly gross income at last loan (000's Rand)* 3.42 3.26 3.56 3.39 3.45
(19.66) (2.63) (27.05) (2.19) (2.07)
Home bond, proportion 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06
(0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.26) (0.24)
External credit score 551.35 544.23 557.82 547.77 571.69
(215.64) (210.22) (220.27) (203.20) (204.22)
No external credit score, proportion 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10
(0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.31) (0.30)
Months at Employer 93.82 90.42 96.92 93.34 96.86
(88.01) (82.55) (92.59) (82.33) (88.53)
# of Observations 57533 27387 30146 2133 2215
B. Loan Characteristics
Amount of last loan prior to experiment 1116.36 1122.87 1110.44 1161.37 1150.86
(829.90) (844.42) (816.46) (798.21) (851.56)
Term of last loan prior to experiment 4.06 4.09 4.03 4.15 4.07
(1.00) (1.01) (1.00) (1.16) (1.09)
# of prior loans with the lender 4.26 4.22 4.29 4.83 4.90
(3.86) (3.82) (3.90) (4.20) (4.26)
# of months since the last loan 10.26 10.21 10.31 5.98 5.82
(6.88) (6.84) (6.92) (5.78) (5.82)
Internal credit score when new borrower 29.66 32.59 26.99 32.97 27.40
(8.75) (8.53) (8.06) (8.38) (8.22)
# of Observations 57533 27387 30146 2133 2215
C. Self-Reported Loan Usage
School 24.2% 13.6%
Housing (mostly renovations) 12.6% 9.8%






Business/Other Investment 2.3% 2.7%
Misc/unreported 28.7% 34.6%
# of Observations 690 775
Table 1b: Summary Statistics 
* Standard deviations are in parentheses. Gross income at time of last loan is missing for participants from pilot phase. Age, gender and
other demographic information also missing for <10 observations. Number of observations reported is the total number, irrespective of
missing data. Usage sample size is low relative to takeup due to reluctance of loan officers to administer survey (the Lender does not
typicallyask applicants about intended usage, and if anything emphasizes that it does not ask such questions). Reported “Consumption”
uses are primarily food (39%) and clothing (23%); “Family/Events” are largely Christmas (45%) expenses; “School” is largely the fees
required for children to attend; “Misc” is largely borrowers declining to specify (88%).Sample 
Restricted to 
Applied = 1
Dependent variable: Contract Rate Offer Rate
Rate Valid for One 
Year (versus One 
Loan) Applied=1 Rejected = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female 0.009 0.028 -0.002
(0.022) (0.021) (0.004)
Married 0.017 0.022 0.004
(0.022) (0.021) (0.004)
External credit score -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No External credit score -0.017 -0.006 0.016
(0.093) (0.091) (0.016)
Internal credit score -0.001 -0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Log (Size of last loan prior to project) -0.017 -0.003 -0.004
(0.017) (0.017) (0.003)
Term of last loan prior to project -0.010 -0.011 -0.001
(0.011) (0.010) (0.002)
# of prior loans with the lender 0.003 0.003 0.001**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Gross income -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Years at Employer 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Mean education 0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
# of dependants 0.002 -0.005 0.000
(0.007) (0.006) (0.001)
Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.000*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Home bond 0.053 0.028 0.011
(0.041) (0.040) (0.007)
# of months since last loan -0.001 -0.001 -0.001***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Offer Interest Rate -0.003***
(0.001)
Contract Interest Rate 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Dynamic Repayment Incentive -0.014
(0.012)
Constant 7.700*** 8.369*** 0.228*** 0.081*** 0.334***
(0.297) (0.292) (0.051) (0.005) (0.075)
Observations 57339 57339 57339 57533 5028
Joint F-Test 0.87 0.96 0.01
R-squared 0.10 0.14 0.37 0.04 0.09
Table 2: Experimental Integrity Checks
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1 through 3 test
whether the randomized variables are correlated with information observable before the experiment launch. For column 3, if the
dormancy variable is omitted the F-test is 0.21. Column 4 shows that the decision to borrow by the client was affected by the Offer
Interest Rate, but not the Contract Interest Rate, hence verifying the internal controls of the experimentalprotocol. Column 5 shows that
the decision by the branch manager to reject applicants was not predicted by the contract interest rate or the dynamic repaymentincentive.
Column 5 sample frame includes only those who applied for a loan. Regressionsinclude controls for lender-defined risk category, month














Average Monthly Proportion Past Due 0.105 0.102 0.23 0.102 0.082 1.90*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004)
Proportion of Months in Arrears 0.244 0.211 2.38** 0.211 0.202 0.72
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006)
Account in Collection Status 0.139 0.123 0.99 0.123 0.101 1.50
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007)
# of observations 1636 625 625 2087
Female
Average Monthly Proportion Past Due 0.089 0.101 -0.85 0.101 0.067 2.42**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.005)
Proportion of Months in Arrears 0.221 0.209 0.64 0.209 0.181 1.55
(0.011) (0.02) (0.02) (0.008)
Account in Collection Status 0.107 0.121 -0.65 0.121 0.082 1.88*
(0.121) (0.019) (0.019) (0.008)
# of observations 779 307 307 1047
Male
Average Monthly Proportion Past Due 0.120 0.103 1.05 0.103 0.099 0.30
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007)
Proportion of Months in Arrears 0.264 0.213 2.60*** 0.213 0.223 -0.51
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009)
Account in Collection Status 0.168 0.126 1.87* 0.126 0.120 0.26
(0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010)
# of observations 857 318 318 1040
In this stylized demonstration of the results, "high" is defined as above the median offer rate for that risk category. This is equal to 7.77% for high risk clients, 7.50% for medium risk clients and 6.00% for
low risk clients.  T-tests assume unequal variances across columns.
Moral Hazard / Repayment Burden Effects Selection Effects







of Months in 
Arrears
Account in Collection 
Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
-0.000 -0.002 0.007* 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.010 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Dynamic Repayment Incentive Dummy (Moral Hazard) -0.011* 0.003 -0.016** 0.013 -0.019** 0.000 -0.021** -0.032** -0.019**
(0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008)
Dynamic Repayment Incentive Size (Moral Hazard) -0.004 -0.008** -0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
0.079*** 0.094*** 0.139*** 0.171*** 0.069*** 0.090*** -0.065** -0.081
(0.014) (0.019) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.052)
Observations 4348 4348 4348 4,348 4348 4348 4348 4348 4348
Adjusted R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.03
Mean of dependent variable 0.09 0.09 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.22 0.12
Prob(both Dynamic Incentive variables = 0) 0.08* 0.01*** 0.05**
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Each column presents results from a single model estimated using the base specification (equation 2). All probit results are marginal effects. Robust standard
errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the branch level. “Offer Rate” and “Contract Rate” are in monthly percentage point units (7.00% interest per month is coded as 7.00). “Dynamic Repayment Incentive” is
an indicator variable equal to one if the contract interest rate is valid for one year (rather than just one loan) before reverting back to the normal (higher) interest rates. "Dynamic Repayment IncentiveSize"interacts the above
indicator variable with the difference between the Lender'snormal rate for that individual's risk category and the experimentallyassigned contract interest rate. All models include controls for lender-defined risk category and
month of offer letter. Including controls for loan size and term does not affect the results. A positive coefficient on the Offer Rate variable indicates adverse selection, a positive coefficient on the Contract Rate variable
indicates a reduced-form repayment burden effect, and a negative coefficient on the Dynamic Repayment Incentive variables indicate moral hazard that is alleviated by the dynamic pricing incentive.
Offer Rate (Selection)
Contract Rate (Repayment Burden)
OLS





Proportion of Months in 
Arrears











































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
-0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.005 -0.008 0.001 0.010*** 0.008* 0.013** 0.013** 0.013 0.011***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004)
0.005 0.014*** 0.010 0.010 0.021** 0.009 -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 -0.006 -0.003 -0.007*
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004)
-0.014 -0.025** -0.020 -0.033** -0.050** -0.020 -0.007 -0.006 -0.017 -0.008 -0.009 -0.016
(0.009) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.025) (0.011)
0.108*** 0.178*** 0.092** -0.008 0.002 0.050*** 0.097*** 0.043 -0.121*** -0.176***
(0.025) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.072) (0.015) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.057)
Observations 2215 2215 2215 2215 2215 2215 2133 2133 2133 2133 2133 2133
R-squared 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.04
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All probit results are marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the branch level. Results reported here







Table 5: Disentangling Selection on Unobservables from Moral Hazard
By Gender
Male Female































# of Fixed Effects for 
All Combinations of 
Other Random 
Variables (see notes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.0027 0.0004 0.0046 -0.0035 -0.0064 -0.0028 0.0092** 0.0067 0.0128**
(0.0026) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0040) (0.0062) (0.0073) (0.0038) (0.0052) (0.0062)
-0.0001 0.0062* 0.0009 0.0052 0.0128*** 0.0091 -0.0056 -0.0023 -0.0090
(0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0075) (0.0035) (0.0051) (0.0056)
-.0120** -0.019** -0.023** -0.013 -0.022 -0.023 -.006 -0.007 -0.018*
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
# of Observations








Dynamic Repayment Incentive Indicator
Female Male Full sample
2133 2,215 4348
Each cell represents a separate OLS specification. For each cell, we report the coefficient on the independent variable named in the row heading obtaining from including a full set of indicator variables for all possible combinations of the
other independent random variables and lender-defined risk category. For example, the top left cell reports the coefficient on the Offer Rate after including fixed effects for every combination of a set of indicator variables for the Contract
































(1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) (10) (11)
Panel A: IV
Total Interest Cost, 000's Rands, at Offer Interest Rate 0.35* 0.29 0.66* -0.03 -0.00 0.41 0.74*** 0.65* 1.00**
(0.20) (0.28) (0.35) (0.29) (0.42) (0.51) (0.27) (0.35) (0.41)
Total Interest Cost, 000's Rands, at Contract Interest Rate -0.00 0.10* 0.01 0.07 0.19** 0.14 -0.09 -0.02 -0.14
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10)
Constant 0.09*** 0.19*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.21*** 0.09** 0.08*** 0.21*** 0.12***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 4348 4348 4348 2215 2215 2215 2133 2133 2133
Panel B: OLS
Total Interest Cost, 000's Rands, at Offer Interest Rate -0.12** 0.01 -0.08 -0.15* 0.06 0.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.19
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13)
Total Interest Cost, 000's Rands, at Contract Interest Rate -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.13*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.27*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.26*** 0.15***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 4348 4348 4348 2215 2215 2215 2133 2133 2133
0.05 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.03
Table 7: Disentangling Selection on Unobservables from Moral Hazard
Instrumental Variables
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the branch level. The two endogenous variables (total interest cost
evaluatedseparatelyat the offer and contract rate) are instrumented with the offer rate and contract rate (please see equations 6-8 in the text). Regressionsinclude controls for lender-defined risk category and
month of offer letter.  Including controls for loan size and term does not affect the results.Demographic Control Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Experimental Variables
Offer Rate 0.023 -0.252 0.089 0.176 0.079 -0.213 0.282 -0.341 2.700 -0.716 0.122 0.082
(0.435) (0.537) (0.432) (0.530) (0.402) (0.410) (1.162) (1.325) (2.338) (4.218) (0.456) (0.495)
Contract Rate 0.415 0.716 0.482 0.660 0.260 0.557 0.269 0.652 -0.968 1.852 0.404 0.442
(0.393) (0.508) (0.446) (0.527) (0.414) (0.440) (1.098) (1.283) (2.707) (4.600) (0.465) (0.523)
Dynamic Repayment Incentive Indicator -1.158 -0.706 -1.098 -1.920 -0.878 -1.081 -1.280 0.934 7.378 3.457 -1.165 -0.691
(1.160) (1.510) (1.237) (1.434) (1.028) (1.252) (2.678) (4.049) (8.692) (12.814) (1.145) (1.465)
Female -2.985 -3.095 -2.558 -1.021 -2.215 -2.652 -1.887 -5.296 -2.821 -30.918 -2.667 -2.298
(1.939) (2.585) (1.980) (3.110) (1.886) (2.631) (1.914) (7.409) (1.926) (28.386) (1.875) (3.073)
Demographic Variable (see column heading) -1.838 -2.040 -0.036 0.427 -1.761 -2.487 -0.172 -0.223 -0.001 -2.020 -0.015 -0.013
(1.952) (2.854) (0.536) (0.741) (2.432) (3.909) (0.105) (0.157) (1.669) (3.019) (0.012) (0.018)
Female * Experimental Variables
Female * Offer Rate 0.887* 1.369** 0.834* 0.637 0.902* 1.534** 0.763* 1.951 0.890** 6.945 0.807* 0.891
(0.456) (0.632) (0.460) (0.661) (0.480) (0.604) (0.455) (1.916) (0.445) (6.117) (0.447) (0.749)
Female * Contract Rate -1.042** -1.575** -1.029** -1.440** -1.138** -1.783*** -0.977** -1.782 -1.040** -6.318 -0.967** -1.047
(0.476) (0.718) (0.497) (0.678) (0.482) (0.640) (0.486) (1.979) (0.474) (7.129) (0.479) (0.748)
Female * Dynamic Repayment Incentive 0.813 -0.037 0.896 2.732 1.077 1.554 0.701 -3.491 0.603 8.148 0.730 -0.290
(1.350) (2.143) (1.343) (2.052) (1.351) (1.903) (1.336) (5.867) (1.353) (14.026) (1.328) (2.363)
Demographic Control Variable * Experimental Variables
Demographic Variable * Offer Rate -0.135 0.415 -0.046 -0.084 -0.400 0.626 -0.008 0.008 -0.343 0.079 -0.002 -0.001
(0.540) (0.796) (0.122) (0.164) (0.625) (0.853) (0.026) (0.030) (0.289) (0.522) (0.003) (0.003)
Demographic Variable * Contract Rate 0.195 -0.397 -0.009 -0.124 0.748 -0.279 0.006 -0.003 0.183 -0.166 0.001 0.001
(0.511) (0.788) (0.141) (0.177) (0.583) (0.776) (0.026) (0.031) (0.325) (0.561) (0.003) (0.003)
Demographic Variable * Dynamic Repayment Incentive -0.577 -1.442 -0.224 0.162 -1.577 -1.017 -0.002 -0.056 -1.077 -0.592 -0.002 -0.007
(1.211) (1.897) (0.353) (0.431) (1.307) (2.104) (0.061) (0.092) (1.042) (1.530) (0.006) (0.009)
Female * Demographic Control Variable
Female * Demographic Variable 0.305 -1.217 1.155 0.083 3.457 -0.004
(3.234) (1.138) (4.167) (0.167) (3.460) (0.023)
Female * Demographic Control Variable * Experimental Variables
Female * Demographic Variable * Offer Rate -1.079 0.111 -1.755 -0.029 -0.748 -0.001
(0.951) (0.274) (1.080) (0.044) (0.758) (0.006)
Female * Demographic Variable * Contract Rate 1.181 0.277 1.777 0.020 0.654 0.001
(1.033) (0.292) (1.196) (0.045) (0.882) (0.005)
Female * Demographic Variable *  Dynamic Repayment Incentive 1.797 -0.968 -1.049 0.102 -0.937 0.011
(2.652) (0.654) (2.713) (0.125) (1.672) (0.015)
Constant 10.161*** 10.236*** 8.917*** 8.252*** 9.608*** 9.821*** 14.984*** 17.066** 9.240 25.704 10.281*** 10.122***
(2.476) (2.791) (2.542) (2.986) (2.240) (2.546) (5.136) (7.222) (13.856) (25.009) (2.642) (3.133)
Observations 4317 4317 4317 4317 4348 4348 4348 4348 4348 4348 4348 4348
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
OLS, Dependent Variable: Monthly Average Percentage Past Due
Table 8: Disentangling Selection on Unobservables from Moral Hazard, by Gender & Demographics
* significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Each column presents results from a single OLS regression on a version of equation (2). Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the branch level. "Educated" is a binary indicator for the
top 25% in years of education, predicted by the client's occupation. Regressions include controls for lender-defined risk category and month of offer letter. Including controls for loan size and term does not affect the results. The dependent variable here is defined in percentage
point terms, not proportions, and hence equals 100x the variable used in other tables.
Age Educated Dependents in Household Married
Log(Monthly Gross 
Income) Tenure at EmploymentSample: All All Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.0029*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.002
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)




Observations 52985 52985 25221 27764
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Each column presents results from a probit
version of equation (2). All results are marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for
clustering at the branch level. Predicted past due percentage is the predicted value for default from Table 10 OLS
specifications. 4548 observations omitted because they were either missing income data for the non-applicants,
received an upward-sloped yield curve on their offer letter (see Karlan and Zinman 2005), or had their letter
returned by the postal system due to a bad address. Regressions include controls for lender-defined risk category
and month of offer letter.
Offer Rate
Table 9: Selection on Observable Information
Probit, Dependent Variable: "Applied for Loan"
Offer Rate* Predicted Past Due Percentage Dependent Variable:













Female -0.015 -0.021*** -0.005 -0.035*** 0.033 -0.029**
(0.019) (0.007) (0.026) (0.010) (0.027) (0.012)
-0.026*** -0.026*** 0.013* 0.013* 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years at Employer -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.002* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gross Income 0.003 0.003 -0.007* -0.007* -0.006 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Education (predicted by occupation) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of Dependents -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.006* -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
External Credit Score -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No External Credit Score -0.097*** -0.100*** -0.244*** -0.251*** -0.075* -0.082*
(0.035) (0.034) (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.044)
Internal Credit Score at First-Time Application -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.014 0.015
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Home Bond 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.012 0.041* 0.038*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
# of prior loans with the lender -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# of months since last loan 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.466*** 0.488*** 0.412*** 0.486*** 0.277*** 0.368***
(0.069) (0.068) (0.087) (0.080) (0.100) (0.089)
Observations 4348 4348 4348 4348 4348 4348
R-squared 0.0886 0.0862 0.1570 0.1520 0.0711 0.0660
Adjusted r-squared 0.0808 0.0796 0.1497 0.1459 0.0631 0.0593
Constant
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Each column presents results from a single OLS regression on a
version of equation (2). Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the branch level. Control dummies
are included for Lender's 14-category risk level (the Lender uses 3 categories for pricing and term, and 11 categories for credit
approval and loan size decisions, internal tracking & reporting).




Proportion of Months    
in Arrears




Dynamic Repayment Incentive Indicator
Log(loan size)
Female * Offer Rate
Female * Contract Rate
Female * Dynamic Repayment IncentiveSample:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Offer Rate 0.008** 0.004 0.004 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Contract Rate 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 0.005 0.008* 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
-0.011* -0.011* -0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.015 -0.015 -0.023
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017)
0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001







Constant 0.078*** 0.083*** 0.105*** 0.040** 0.046*** 0.070*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.142***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.034) (0.032) (0.025)
Observations 4317 4317 4317 2119 2119 2119 2198 2198 2198
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Each column presents results from as ingle OLS regression on a version of equation (2). Robust standard errors in
parentheses are corrected for clustering at the branch level. Regressions include controls for lender-defined risk category and month of offer letter. Including controls for loan size
and term does not affect the results.
All Male Female
Table 11: Do Information Asymmetries Diminish for Clients with More Frequent Borrowing History?
OLS, Dependent Variable: Monthly Average Proportion Past Due
Offer Rate*# of prior loans
Rate Valid for One Year*# of prior loans
Dynamic Repayment Incentive Indicator
# of prior loans with the lender
Contract Rate*# of prior loansFreq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
3.25% 144           1.77% 304           3.74% 94           1.51% 172         2.77% 586         1.36% 1,017        2.35%
3.49% 281           3.46% 347           4.27% 110         1.77% 135         2.18% 756         1.75% 934           2.16%
3.50% 267           3.29% 393           4.84% 116         1.87% 163         2.63% 540         1.25% 931           2.16%
3.75% 32             0.39% 42             0.52% 18           0.29% 26           0.42% 53           0.12% 80            0.19%
3.99% 367           4.52% 580           7.14% 104         1.68% 229         3.69% 754         1.75% 1,400        3.24%
4.00% 199           2.45% 341           4.20% 99           1.60% 144         2.32% 525         1.22% 845           1.96%
4.25% 40             0.49% 61             0.75% 22           0.35% 29           0.47% 59           0.14% 69            0.16%
4.44% 208           2.56% 380           4.68% 79           1.27% 214         3.45% 494         1.14% 1,220        2.82%
4.49% 399           4.91% 330           4.06% 139         2.24% 136         2.19% 775         1.79% 866           2.00%
4.50% 176           2.17% 288           3.54% 99           1.60% 149         2.40% 591         1.37% 826           1.91%
4.75% 45             0.55% 39             0.48% 22           0.35% 29           0.47% 60           0.14% 77            0.18%
4.99% 202           2.49% 378           4.65% 117         1.89% 211         3.40% 713         1.65% 1,347        3.12%
5.00% 283           3.48% 332           4.09% 119         1.92% 168         2.71% 550         1.27% 809           1.87%
5.25% 45             0.55% 49             0.60% 19           0.31% 26           0.42% 67           0.16% 77            0.18%
5.49% 338           4.16% 387           4.76% 149         2.40% 239         3.85% 712         1.65% 1,330        3.08%
5.50% 426           5.24% 415           5.11% 97           1.56% 144         2.32% 604         1.40% 761           1.76%
5.55% 288           3.54% 267           3.29% 81           1.31% 120         1.93% 513         1.19% 660           1.53%
5.75% 46             0.57% 56             0.69% 20           0.32% 27           0.44% 74           0.17% 92            0.21%
5.99% 495           6.09% 409           5.03% 213         3.43% 259         4.17% 712         1.65% 1,175        2.72%
6.00% 402           4.95% 315           3.88% 118         1.90% 141         2.27% 586         1.36% 766           1.77%
6.25% 49             0.60% 51             0.63% 24           0.39% 25           0.40% 74           0.17% 80            0.19%
6.50% 388           4.77% 377           4.64% 125         2.01% 201         3.24% 611         1.41% 1,286        2.98%
6.75% 422           5.19% 335           4.12% 148         2.38% 198         3.19% 569         1.32% 903           2.09%
6.99% 464           5.71% 308           3.79% 231         3.72% 192         3.09% 775         1.79% 903           2.09%
7.00% 435           5.35% 292           3.59% 201         3.24% 194         3.13% 855         1.98% 881           2.04%
7.25% 399           4.91% 273           3.36% 200         3.22% 205         3.30% 834         1.93% 1,028        2.38%
7.49% 575           7.08% 347           4.27% 260         4.19% 212         3.42% 1,015      2.35% 977           2.26%
7.50% 357           4.39% 229           2.82% 195         3.14% 166         2.67% 849         1.97% 825           1.91%
7.75% 354           4.36% 201           2.47% 181         2.92% 162         2.61% 909         2.10% 1,033        2.39%
7.77% -            -            -            -            200         3.22% 138         2.22% 825         1.91% 719           1.66%
7.99% -            -            -            -            224         3.61% 159         2.56% 1,029      2.38% 933           2.16%
8.00% -            -            -            -            168         2.71% 160         2.58% 891         2.06% 830           1.92%
8.19% -            -            -            -            235         3.79% 167         2.69% 1,024      2.37% 829           1.92%
8.25% -            -            -            -            25           0.40% 28           0.45% 74           0.17% 79            0.18%
8.50% -            -            -            -            215         3.46% 164         2.64% 830         1.92% 984           2.28%
8.75% -            -            -            -            35           0.56% 23           0.37% 82           0.19% 77            0.18%
8.88% -            -            -            -            221         3.56% 153         2.47% 805         1.86% 851           1.97%
8.99% -            -            -            -            263         4.24% 174         2.80% 1,044      2.42% 814           1.88%
9.00% -            -            -            -            214         3.45% 128         2.06% 877         2.03% 756           1.75%
9.25% -            -            -            -            218         3.51% 145         2.34% 890         2.06% 867           2.01%
9.49% -            -            -            -            300         4.83% 170         2.74% 1,162      2.69% 879           2.03%
9.50% -            -            -            -            37           0.60% 28           0.45% 89           0.21% 82            0.19%
9.69% -            -            -            -            234         3.77% 137         2.21% 1,201      2.78% 892           2.06%
9.75% -            -            -            -            217         3.50% 116         1.87% 889         2.06% 727           1.68%
9.99% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          1,242      2.87% 887           2.05%
10.00% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          1,253      2.90% 876           2.03%
10.25% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          1,276      2.95% 892           2.06%
10.49% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          1,494      3.46% 964           2.23%
10.50% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          1,282      2.97% 833           1.93%
10.75% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          93           0.22% 73            0.17%
10.99% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          1,390      3.22% 899           2.08%
11.00% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          1,385      3.21% 857           1.98%
11.11% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          1,345      3.11% 800           1.85%
11.19% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          1,498      3.47% 867           2.01%
11.25% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          104         0.24% 77            0.18%
11.50% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          99           0.23% 72            0.17%
11.69% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          1,431      3.31% 834           1.93%
11.75% -            -            -            -            -          -          -          -          1,382      3.20% 753           1.74%
Total 8,126 100% 8,126 100% 6,206 100% 6,206 100% 43,201 100% 43,201 100%
Appendix Table 1. Frequency of Monthly Offer and Contract Interest Rates


































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.007 0.005 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.011
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007)
-0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.002 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007)
-0.010* -0.021** -0.017** -0.023** -0.040** -0.016**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.020) (0.007)
0.087*** 0.149*** 0.067*** -0.035 -0.058
(0.016) (0.029) (0.023) (0.033) (0.064)
Observations 2715 2715 2715 2715 2715 2,715
R-squared 0.06 0.12 0.04
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Robust standard errors in parentheses are corrected 
for clustering at the branch level.  All models include controls for lender-defined risk category and month of offer letter.  







Appendix Table 2: Table 4 Results using a Common Support
Sample Restricted to Those Offered ≤ 7.75%, the Ceiling for Low Risk Clients